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EVERY now and again it is, I think, profitable to turn from our work in the laboratory or in the wards and to take a general survey of the state of our science. So long as we do not allow such reflective pauses to paralyse our initiative or the hlom7zo loquax to obtain ascendancy over the homo faber, there is little harm done and possibly some good. Generalities that would be unbearable in a strictlv techlnical discussion may perhaps be most conveniently dealt with from time to time on such occasions as a presidential address. A neurologist is of necessity interested in more aspects of nervous activity than those susceptible of investigation in the labor,atory. Inasmuch as the nervous system determines and is determined by all aspects of organic ontology, he must be a biologist in the widest sense, and in spite of the irrational division of labour that exists in this country, he should be a psychologist. Now, however happy we may be while working at our selected problems in the neurological field, we are all not a little embarrassed when we try to relate our l)articular view-points with those of others and to relate them to any generalized scheme of nervous function. 1 propose to formulate some of these difficulties and to suggest what I venture to think may be a methodological aid to their comprehension, but such an attempt within the compass of a single address can only be of the most sketchy nature and supported by the minimum of evidential facts.
In the first place we may consider some aspects of scientific metlhodology as applied to the study of the nervous system. Let us, however, be clear as to this, thcAt so far as concerns the application of scientific methods to our problem we have only the right to look for a relation of observed facts either directly described or mathematically symbolized. Science can never explain in the sense of telling us why things happen. An epistemology founded solely on sense data can give us nothing but an observed sequence of events; it can give us no theory of causation and it is nonsense to characterize an event as determined or undetermined. I preface what I have to say with this caution because if we find later that our scientific method is inadequate to describe the whole of nervous activity it is of no use to reply that it must be valid after all because it affords an explanation of certain observed phenomena. Science only relates, it explains nothing.
If we ask a neurophysiologist what ideal he envisages in his work he will inevitably answer that he is preparing the path for an ultimate account of the activities of the nervous system in mechanical terms. The time would not suffice for an adequate discussion of the implications of such a mechanistic programme. I should like to refer anyone interested to the admirable discussion of the subject by Woodger in his " Biological Principles." I can at present only touch on a few points. Broad says, only be applicable to microscopic and not to macroscopic entities. In practice all the more rigid forms of mechanism require a microscopic analysis of phenomena, and this is simply because they are palpably false if asserted to apply directly to all macroscopic phenomena. Macroscopically there are laws of nature which are not capable of a mechanical analysis, for example, the laws of electromagnetics. Hence pure mechanism is certainly false if it be asserted to hold macroscopically of everything in the world.
Mechanism, however, in this strict sense is not intended by the neurophysiologist. What he really means is that he endeavours to describe nervous processes by using the concepts of physics and chemistry. It is true that when we press for further inforrnation we find that the majority of physiologists are still dominated by a nineteenth century materialism, and that their ultimate reality appears to consist of little bits of matter pushing each other about. This is not, however, of methodological importance. As Andrade says: Whether the man of science regards his atoms as having an ultimate reality or not does not affect the validity of the theory; the theory is just as useful in introducing order and promoting discovery if they are merely polite fictions as if they are desperate realities." The success of biophysics and biochemistry is in no -way dependent on their metaphysical validity. As Vaihinger has taught us in" The Philosophy of As If," our whole philosophy is based on the employment of useful fictions and the chemical and physical theory of life is just such a useful fict-ion.
It is oibvious, however, that even from a mechanistic point of view the activities of the nervous system cannot be expressed solely in chemical and physical terms. Needham has given an amusing quotation from the writings of Albert Matthews that will express this point as well as I could hope to do in a lengthy and technical argument. " Adsorption," he says, " is a physiochemical term meaning the concentration of substances at phase boundaries in heterogenous systems. Dressing can be called a process of adsorption. Every morning clothing which has been distributed throughout our environment-dispersed in the surrounding phaseconcentrates itself at the surface of our bodies. At night the process is reversed.
We might go on to express these events by a curve or isotherm showing how the quantity adsorbed is a function of the amount in the room, how it usually proceeds to an equilibrium, how it is greater at low than at high temperatures, that it is reversible and not accompanied by chemical change in the clothes, that it is specific in that certain clothes are adsorbed with greater avidity than others, and finally we could prove that the clothing moved into the surface film in virtue of the second law of thermodynamics and in consonance with the principle of Willard Gibbs." This parable is self-explanatory and it is onlv when the physical and chemical concepts are supplemented by the introduction of macroscopic mechanism that nervous activity can become superficially intelligible. The nervous system from this point of view consists of a republic of mechanisms each possessing a definite anatomical structure and responding in a characteristic fashion to specific environmental changes.
It is by the study of these isolated mechanisms and by their functional integration that our conception of the activities of the nervous system has been built up with a considerable degree of success. I shall only venture to point out as briefly as possible certain difficulties that attend this method. We have been amply warned by Sherrington that an isolated reflex is an abstraction, and that every reflex is influenced by the activity of the rest of the nervous system, but it is disconcerting to find how little these warnings have been appreciated in the past and the appalling difficulties engendered by their neglect. Perhaps it is the nature of the activity and not the architecture of the mechanism that is the predominant factor. We can all satisfy ourselves of this by such a simple experiment as the first attempt to write with the left hand when movements which had hitherto been solely executed by a highly complex mechanism are found to be executed by the unaccustomed hand with a wonderful degree of success. To direct app)ropriate activities of the organism the nervous system functions as a whole, and by virtue of its ability obstruction of any one executive mechanism will be compensated, however imperfectly, by the remainder. On the sensory side it is -of course obvious that interruption of paths conveying environmental stimuli to the central nervous system is absolute in its effects. It is lack of the appreciation of -the fact that a highly labile nervous system acts as a whole that has led to the hasty and superficial generalization drawn by the behaviourists from the great work of Pavlov. No one studying the technique of his school can fail to appreciate that we lhave in the conditioned reflex an abstraction. The study of the conditioned reflex is invaluable as indicating how, under certain conditions, a uniform response may be built up, but highly misleading if it be imagined that with the nervous system functioning in its normal entirety behaviour can be integrated from a sequence of rigidly conditioned responses. The Pavlov experimental animal is in a highly abnormal condition. It has been isolated from external environment to an extent that hardly ever occurs in normal life, the internal somatic environment has been similarly tranquillized, and it is not till when, in the absence of the majority of environmental stimuli, the nervous system has entered into a state of torpid equilibrium that the specific experimental stimuli can be applied with success for the dlemonstration of conditioned reflexes.
So far we have been considering the relation of the nervous system as a whole to its specific activities. This is, however, but a part of the organic whole. Its activities are affected and affect the entire chemical and physical milieu constituted by the body. It would be impossible here to discuss the relations of the nervous svstem to the chemical milieu. I need only remind you that the reactions are reciprocal. A great mass of experimental and pathological investigation has deiiionstrated the manifold effects of variations of the ionic eouilibrium of the blood and tissues on the excitability and mode of reaction of the nervous system. There is an increasing amount of evidence of a reciprocal action of the nervous systemn on the ionic equilibrium of the blood and tissues. The study of the hormonic regulation of the activity of central nervous mechanisms is still in its infancy. WVe had been so long accustomed to dealing with the peripheral action of hormones that their central activity was for a time neglected. Of late evidences. of the action of the various vegetative nerve centres of the diencephalon by the internal secretions of the pituitary have been added to almost daily whilst evidence of the reciprocal control of pituitary activity by the diencephalic centres is suggestive. The reaction of the somatic system by means of hormonic influence on central nervous mechanisms is, moreover, not confined to those mechanisms subserving vegetative functions. The reaction of a castrated animal to testicular extract is a case in point.
We cannot neglect yet another aspect of the relation of the whole to thenervous system and that is the factor of time or duration. No stimulus-reaction event can ever leave the nervous system in the same condition as before. Even when we are investigating a physiological abstraction, an isolated reflex in a physiological preparation, we note minor variations in the responses to physically identical stimuli, variations quite apart from those which we ascribe to refractory period, facilitation and fatigue. We are sufficiently content if these variations are negligible for our purposes, knowing that our experimentally isolated reflex arc is still far from isolated from the many adjacent nervous structures mutilated and disordered by our operations. But in the activities of the organism considered in relation to the whole, that is to the natural environment, temporal flux plays a far greater role. The environment itself is not static, but its change may be slow and inappreciable; the nervous system, infinitely more labile, is in a state of continuous change. Every reaction leaves its imprint not only on the mechanism immediately involved, but on the whole of the nervous system. Never again will the potential activity of your organism be the same as it was a few minutes or even a fraction of a second ago. Just as the question of free will or determinism is a false dilemma, because never again can the same set of conditions occur, so in the intact nervous system an identical response is impossible. If this may seem to be a trifling with minutite when we are considering very simple physiological problems, it is very far from insignificant when we deal with reactions of the whole organism. Even caterpillar in exactly the right segment to paralyse the nervous system, lays its eggs in the paralysed body and flies away, having ensured that the larvie which it will never see shall in the course of time hatch out and feed on an unresisting host. How, it may be asked, can such a series of events be explained by any mechanical theory? Now if we do not go beyond the immediate data I cannot see that these and similar acts, such as the nest-making of a bird or rabbit, are qualitatively different from a much simpler behaviou'r pattern such as impregnation performed by an animal or even savage man. In the latter case the functional chain, set in motion by the proximity of the female, conditions first the act of copulation and the reflex sequence next involves an entirely different groul) of nervous mechanisms leading to discharge of the semen. In the case of the wasp the temporal sequence is sting, then egg deposition, and of course in neither case is there foreknowledge of the ultimate result. The real difficulty lies elsewhere and is, I think, insuperable for a mechanistic methodology. A nervous system is not to be thought of as only a collection of functional mechanisms completed and ready to respond to environmental changes. It is a present event embodying a history, and considered apart from its history or temporal extension it is an abstraction. As Broad puts it: " An object separated from its history is clearly not the kind of thing that could possibly exist. .. It is evident that every object has a time dimension as well as any space dimensions it may have." There is nothing mysterious about this; it means no more than that every existing object, whether at rest or in motion, is a strand of history with some duration. To account in mechanistic terms for the order and development of the successive functional unities in the example of instinctive behaviour that we have just been considering is impossible. We have invented a machine without a mechanic and in a scientific inquiry we are not free, at any rate at present, to envisage the theological assumptions that made Cartesian mechanism possible. When we are confronted by an insoluble antinomy we are justified in inquiring whether the problem is legitimately presented, whether in fact the impasse has not been originated by the unjustifiable abstraction of certain particulars from a connected whole. In other words, I question an epistemology based on the abstraction of such elements as only lend themselves to ultimate chemical and physical investigation. As Jacks has pointed out, no system of philosophy can hope to survive that does not include an account of the philosopher himself. Similarly no account of the nervous system can be other than an abstraction that does not envisage its relation to mental events. For present purposes we need not be tied to any theory of the relation of mind to body, we need only the brute fact, verifiable by the evidence of normal and pathological psychology, that mental events are invariably accompanied by related nervous events. If we study our own behaviour introspection informs us that a sequence of activities leading to the achievement of an objective remote in time exhibits at its inception awareness of the objective and at every later stage awareness of the adaptation of the succeeding activities to the end in view.
There is no evidence that an operation of consciousness can take place without concomitant activity of the nervous system, hence, whatever be the relation of this nervous activity to the purposive mental process, it must at least include the nervous correlate of purpose. Whether or not our attention be directed to the purpose of a course of action is determined by general conditions with which we are not concerned for the moment. We may be from the onset immediately aware of the aim of our activity, or only after introspective inquirv, or again we may only receive a step-by-step revelation of the more proximate aims in a temporal series. In every case the principle of regarding nervous function as a whole compels us to predicate some condition of nervous activity that is related to the purpose of which we are aware. Inasmuch as the activities of lower animals exhibit a like character of orientation we are justified in assigning a directive or teleological factor to nervous function as a whole. We have in fact found some evidence of a mechanic for our machine.
The proposition that I am supporting is of such vital importance for a holistic interpretation of nervous function, and there is so much muddled thinking on the subject, that perhaps it may be pardonable to reiterate it, avoiding the technical language of metaphysics. From the purely empirical standpoint the data are theseMy own awareness of purpose is a private datum, but I receive certain sensory data from my fellow-men which I interpret as communicating that they also are aware of purpose in their activities. I only achieve this result by an act of faith in the existence of other minds. That this is an act of faith and not a datum of experience, is obvious, but it is a faith that is universal and there is nothing to be gained by a discussion as to the mind's knowledge of other minds. The data of pathology tell me that in the absence of nervous activity there is no awareness of purpose in my fellow-men, and I have to assume that this holds true for myself. Further, an analysis of my experience of purpose tells me that it is compounded of kinaesthetice and sensory images, and again I find as a neurologist that destruction of certain parts of the nervous system renders the entertainment of such images impossible.
I can then assume that there is a nervous activity correlative, but certainly not identical, with my awareness of purpose. As the chain of actions that is necessary for the achievement of my purpose unfolds itself I find that each phase of activity is tinged with the same awareness of purposeful orientation.
In popular language I know why I am doing something. It follows, therefore, that the whole chain of physical nervous activities possesses the same attributes that are necessary correlatives of the awareness of purpose in the mind. It should be unnecessary to say at this point that no theory of the relation of bodily and mental states is implied. Now with repetition or perhaps from preoccupation with othermatters I often find that a purposive action is unaccompanied by awareness of purpose unless at some stage I interrogate myself and by an intellectual effort bring the awareness of the original and present purposeful nature of my activities into the field of consciousness. This generally occurs when some obstacle or interruption occurs to the chain of purposeful activity, and if I had to answer in a few words the query of James's famous essay: " Does consciousness exist ? " I should reply: " Only when difficulty or interruption occurs in the course of vital activity.'> Sometimes these patterns of reaction ruin so smoothly that awareness is entirely absent and the purposeful nature of the activity can only be inferred rather than recollected.
Now there is no functional break between all these forms of activity. From theobjective point of view the form of activity is indistinguishable in the case in which I designedly perform an action, such as withdrawing a foot from an unpleasant stimulus, and bestow meticulous care on the purposeful direction of every movement to that end, when I negligently repeat the same movement as a habitual reaction only becoming aware of its purposefulness by introspection, and when the action is performed for the first time by an infant or an ament, and hence, never had a conscious correlation. The physical orientation which may or may not be cognized as purpose is present in all these cases, since they indistinguishably lead to the same end-effect. It is the orientation of activity to a specific purpose that is the dominant characteristic, and in certain conditions we are assured by consciousness that this dominance was present throughout. If these arguments are sound we seem to have arrived at a teleological interpretation of nervous function, not by what Avernarius would have termed anthropomorphic introjection, but as a deduction from the consideration of thenervous system in relation to the whole of its activities. There is more, then, than methodological expediency in the advice of Sherrington to consider reflex function from the teleological point of view. Now teleology has an evil reputation in science. The doom of Aristotelian teleology was pronounced in the seventeenth centurv by Bacon when he said that Final causes" might be "well collected and inquired in Metaphysick but in Physick they are impertinent." And yet, as we have seen, teleology in human experience is a living fact. It is the conception of a final cause that is dead. It belongs to a static view of the universe that is untenable alike for the scientist and the metaphysician. Teleology does not imply orientation towards a final cause for there can be no finality. Teleological activity not only transcends proximity in the temporal life of the individual but, coextensive with life in the universe, it transcends the individual life. The universe is a continuous becoming and the great service that M. Bergson has rendered to this age is to re-examine the teaching of the Eleatics. The aim is implicit in the whole and it is in its relation to the wilole that the nervous system is influenced by the aim. It is true, however, that as Boutroux and Poincare have shown us there is an element of contingency in natural laws. The teleological orientation of the nervous system may not necessarily attain its aim, it may indeed be sometimes ill-adjusted for such attainment.
It is no easy task that I am proposing; it demands a fundamental change in our methods of thought. It is from the present whole of the external and internal environment that we are called on to construct our picture of the nervous system, not from a synthetic integration of primarily abstracted mechanisms. How does this accord with science 2 Eddington shows how physical science is to all intents a closed cycle depeniding on a circular array of definitions. To quote Needham:
"Potential" is defined in terms of "intervals," the intervals in terms of scales or clocks, the scales or clocks in terms of "matter," and matter in terms of mass," "momentum," and "stress." These latter entities are analytical expressions containing various combinations of potentials-a term we have already defined. What is true for physical science should also be true for biology if it wvere a rigid science. There appears to be no room for teleological orientation. It seems a hard case but if we are right in our proof that teleology is an experienced fact so much the worse for our methodology. We have illegitimately abstracted our scientific premises from the organic whole. I suspect, too, that some of our resistance is emotional. We forget the truism that I mentioned earlier; science cannot explain. To talke an example from physics: To satisfy this persistent why, Newton formulated the law of gravitation in terms of forces. No one now believes that these forces exist and it is a matter of unimportance to the scientist whether they exist or not. The law of gravitation and its forces is a mathematical formula and a mathematical formiiula cannot cause bodies to fall. As Stace points out, exactly the same criticism applies to the introduction of irregularities of space time in Einstein's law. We can only relate the data of experience and not explain them. This lust for explanation is, as the same writer puts it, the desire to express unfamiliar symhols in terms of familiar symbols. It is a desire emotional rather than. intellectual in origin.
An acceptance of teleological activity greatly amplifies our conception of the status of the nervous system in relation to that which Smuts terms the lholistic universe. To the neurologist in his clinical capacity the gain should be great. Our reinterpretation of nervous function in terms of the whole reveals neural organization as dynamic rather than static. The effect of a lesion is to cause simplification of behaviour rather than radical alteration. The nervous system collaborates with fewer units, but by re-arrangement of its functional mechanism still tends to maintain its teleological orientation. No such re-arrangement is possible without affecting nervous function throughout the whole system. by the ideas of inhibition which I have already criticized. It would be more fruitful to regard these reactions as representing the attempt on the ]art of the nervous system to utilize older and simpler forms of activity to adjust itself to its environment rather than as the unchaining of a group of nervous mechanisms that run riot in purposeless activity.
The universe regarded as an organic whole exhibits a continuous process of change. Of finality or the ultimate direction of this flow we can know nothing and it is for this reason that R. S. Lillie's mathematical interpretation of teleology fails. He presents it as a special case of the theorem of Le Chatelier and holds that the attainment of equilibrium between living organisms would express all organic teleology. If from the past history of the whole we can learn something of the significance of specific types of nervous activity, so it is possible for us from such indications as we can gather of the immediate teleological direction to guess at the meaning of certain p)reponderant nervous functions. Man is the first being in organic history that has the power to say "No " to emotional urgency when it threatens to interrupt his teleological activity. As Goldstein puts it, he is the first ascetic. This supersession of the organic reactions, rather than the increasing power of discriminating activity, seems to me to be the significant fact of nervous development. Whether it is a promise of continued progress is another matter. It is fashionable for the neoplatonists, for reasons that do not concern us here, to doubt the probability of further human progress. From the empirical point of view, however, it is possible to ignore arguments based on the absence of any distinct evidence of progress within recent history. A geneticist would smile if asked to draw conclusions from such scanty material. As James once said in another connexion: in an audience of some sixty or seventy people if each person in it could speak for his own generation we should be carried away to the black unknown of the human species, to days w-ithout a document or monument to tell their tale. To pass DEC.-NEUR. 2 * to the concrete, human history even in so short a time does give us some evidence in favour of this thesis. The ingestion of food no longer plays a predominant part in our daily life; the lust for destruction and aggression, in spite of recent history, is deprived of much of its old power; if I interpret rightly the trend of art away from the chocolate-box designer and the ballad-monger, I seem to discern the coming of a day when an unattractive appearance will no longer deprive human beings of the greatest of all spiritual values. We have no guarantee of progress but there is, I think, no evidence of regression. If the creative activity of the whole on the brain as an organ of mind be in the direction of progressive development I am personally not frightened by entropy and the second law of thermodynamics, for I doubt their applicability to the organic whole.
As neurologists we can only follow these functional indications by thinking of the nervous system in relation to the organic whole and abstaining from conclusions based solely on either mechanical or one-sided psychological abstractions. The method was foreseen by Waterston, a little-known physicist, "who," I quote from Dr. Myers, " in 1843 gave expression to the view that the phenomena of mind will one day be employed to throw light on the-phenomena of matter . . that organization is the striking feature and that if molecular philosopny is ever destined to advance into the region of (biological) organization the phenomena of perceptive consciousness will admit of being applied to illustrate the physical aspect of the elementary process of matter." It is a part of this programme that I have endeavoured only imperfectly to put before you. By conceiving the nervous-system as an organic whole we arrive at a new understanding of nervous mechanism. By further extending our conception of the whole to include mental activities we obtain a teleological view of mechanism that enlarges its significance. Our resistance to the removal of the self-imposed limitations to our own particular methodology is a natural one. Method is an economy of thought and mankind fears thought more than it fears death. We have found our several methods to work well each in its own sphere of action and it is not till impertinent outsiders try to correlate our results that we realize how far removed each is from the reality of the whole.
Restrictions that give the illusion of a complete system are very precious to us. I remember when in the exuberance of youth I told an aged relative (the indiscretion subsequently proved expensive) that I did not believe in the devil, she answered sorrowfully, "You want to take everything from me."
Science has long ago abjured the evil one of Cartesian dualism but it in practice is loth to part with a comforting hypothesis that simplified its methodology.
Physical science has freed itself from the tempter but biological science still lags behind,. basing itself on nineteenth century physics. As Whitehead puts it:
Scientific rZsoning is completely dominated by the presupposition that mental functionings are not properly part of nature. Accordingly it disregards all those mental antecedents which mankind habitually presuppose as effective in guiding cosmological functionings. As a method this procedure is entirely justifiable, provided that we recognize the limitations involved. These limitations are obvious and undefined. The gradual eliciting of their definition is thehope of philosophy. These considerations may seem to have little application to conventional neurology. I am afraid that I am unrepentant. I look forward to a day when a neurologist will be ahumanist in the widest sense, wben the psychiatrist will no longer shun the laboratory and the neurophysiologist will be the trusted collaborator of the psychologist.
